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MORTGAGES TO SECURE FUTURE ADVANCES.
THAT a mortgage is valid though no money pass at the time
and the whole purpose is to create a lien for future advances or
a security against loss from liabilities to be subsequently incurred,
has long been firmly settled: Tyfle v. .Ducomb, 5 Binn. 585;
Shirra8v. Caig, 7 Cranch 34; Ladue v. ).& ff. Railroad Co.,
13 Mich. 380, and cases there cited.
How far the rights of such a mortgagee will be affected by a subsequent mortgage has been the subject of considerable discussion.
I. In the early English case of Gordon v. Grahiam, 7 Vin. Abr.
52, pl. 3; s. c.2 Eq. Cases Abr. 598, it was held that the second
mortgagee could not redeem the first mortgage without paying
all that is due, as well the money lent after as that lent before
the second mortgage was made, although according to the report
of the case the first mortgagee had notice of the second mortgage;
for, said Lord Chancellor COWPER, "1it was the folly of the second
mortgagee with notice to take such a security."
In ffopkineon v. Rolt, 7 Juriat N. S. 1209 (1861), however, this
case came before the House of Lords, and the original entries in
the registrar's book were most carefully and minutely examined
by Lord Chancellor CAMPBELL, and the court came to the conclusion that the case had been misreported as to the fact that the
first mortgagee had notice of the second mortgage, and after mature consideration it was held by Lords CAMPBELL and CHELmSVOL. XX.-18

(273)

MORTGAGES TO SECURE

(Lord ORANWORTH dissenting), that the first mortgagee was
not entitled to priority as to any advances made after notice of
the second mortgage. This case has settled the law in England
so far as relates to optional advances by a.first mortgagee after
notice of the second mortgage.
IL In this country it may be considered as settled, that where
the mortgagee has bound himself to make advances or incur liabilities, such advances shall relate back and the mortgage when
recorded is a valid lien for all the advances actually made,
although they may have been made after notice of a subsequent
mortgage or encumbrance of the same property: 3 Kent's Com.
175; Lyle v. Ducomb, 5 Binn. 585; ioroney's Appeal, 12 Harris 362; s. c. 3 Am. Law Reg. 0. S. 169; Crain v. Deming, 7
Conn. 387; Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 495; Griffin v. Burtnett,
4 Edw. Ch. 673.
III. So also if the advances are made without notice, actual or
constructive, of the second mortgage: Ladue v. D. & X. Railroad Co., 13 Mich. 393.
[V. But where there is n6 obligation on the mortgagee and
such advances are optional with him, and he has actual notice of
the subsequent mortgage, such subsequent mortgage takes precedence of all advances made after notice: Boswell v. Goodwin, 31
Conn. 74; s. a. 3 Am. Law Reg. 1. S. 79; Nelson's Heirs v.
Boyce, 7 J. J. Marsh. 401; Ladue v. -D. & f. Railroad Co., 13
Mich. 380; Ward v. Cooke, 2 C. E. Green 93; rye v. Bank,
11 Ills. 881; .Bankc of Montgomery's Appeal, 12 Casey 170; s.
a. sub. nom. Parker v. Jacoby, 3 Grant 300; Terffoven v.
Kerns, 2 Barr 96.
V. Whether under the various recording or registering acts
of this country, the record of the second mortgage is such notice
as to bring the mortgagee within the last rule, is still an unsettled
point.
In Vermont in the case of lic1aniels v. :oolvin, 16 Vt. 800,
decided in 1844, a mortgage for a specified sum "and also what
I may owe on book account," was held as against a subsequent
mortgage to be a valid lien for items of book account incurred
subsequently to the recording of the second mortgage. It was
indeed still further intimated in this case that the'second mortgagee must not only give actual notice of his mortgage to the
first mortgagee but must expressly notify the latter not to increase
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his mortgage by future advances in derogation of the lien of the
second. This extent of the rule, however, has not been followed,
and we doubt if it would now be insisted upon even in Yermont.
See remarks of REDFIELD, J., in 3 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 91-2.
In Connecticut in the case of Rowan v. Shar27's Mllanufacturing Co., 29 .Conn. 282, in January 1852 R. had entered into a
written contract with S. to advance to the latter $40,000 for a
specific purpose, and took the legal title to certain land as security. Subsequently, in 1854 S. made a mortgage of the same
property to a third person, who had notice of the agreement
between R. and S. This mortgage was put on record at once, but
actual knowledge of it did not come to R. until December 1855.
In October 1856 the advances amounted to $75,000, and S.
failed. On a bill by the mortgagee to redeem, it was held that
the legal title being in R. the recording of the mortgage was no
notice to him, and all advances made prior to actual notice were
a prior lien to the mortgage, and further that after actual notice
R. still had a right to make all advances necessary to enable S.
to carry out the original contract. The tendency of the court
would appear to have been towards the rule adopted in .leDaniels
v. Colvin, but in a subsequent case in the same court where the
point arose directly upon a mortgage, SANFORD, J., indicated his
disapprobation of that rule, but the court not being unanimous
on that point disposed of the case on other grounds, leaving the
question still open in that state: Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74.
In New York it appears to have been thought at one time by
Chancellor KE.'T that the mere execution of a second mortgage
or deed would prevent the lien of advances after that: Brinkerhoff
v. Mfartin, 5 Johns. Ch. 826-7; Craigv. Tappin, 2 Sandf. Ch.
90; but this eminent jurist in his Commentaries subsequently conceded that the advances might be made after the second mortgage
if they were made as "a constituent part of the original agreement," 4 Kent 175; and the rules as laid down already (supra,
II., III., and IV.) are now well settled in New York as in other
states. In Truscott v. King, 6 Barb. 846, it was expressly held
that under the recording acts the constructive notice of a recorded
instrument is prospective only and not retrospective; and that
the recording'of a mortgage was not therefore notice to a prior
mortgagee or holder of a judgment to secure advances, so as to
affect in any way the lien of his advances subsequently made.
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This case upon a review in the Court of Appeals was reversed, 2
Selden 166, but on the distinct ground that it was wrong on the
facts, the security having been given for certain specified advances
which had all been repaid prior to the second judgment, and
therefore the mortgage having fulfilled the whole of the purpose
in the contemplation of the parties when it-was made, could not
be afterwards revived as security for a different obligatiof, to the
detriment of intervening rights of third persons. The ground
of the decision below was therefore left untouched, EDMONDS, J.,
saying in his opinion that he was inclined to think the principle
established was right but it was not decisive of the case. And in
the subsequent case of Robinson v. t illiams, 22 N. Y. 380, it.
appears to be assumed that actual notice of the second mortgage
was necessary to affect advances subsequently made under a prior
one: Opinion of DAviEs, J., p. 386. It may therefore be considered that the weight of authority in New York is against
treating the recording of the second mortgage as equivalent to
notice to the first mortgagee, though perhaps the law is not yet
conclusively settled.
In New Jersey a very distinguished jurist, Chancellor GREEN,
held that the recording of the second mortgage was not notice to
-the first mortgagee: Ward "v.Cooke, 2 C. E. Green 93; and the
law appears to be held in the same way in Kentucky: Nelson's
Heirs v. Boyce, 7 J. J. Marshall 401; and in Maryland: Wilson
v. Russell, 13 Md. 495; though in the latter case the decision is
not expressly in point, as the first mortgagee was bound to make
the advances.
On the other hand, in Spader v. Lawler, 17 Ohio 371 (decided
in 1848), it was for the first time held expressly (though the Pennsylvania cases mentioned infra had previously tended the same
way), that the first mortgagor was bound before making his (optional) advances to take notice of a junior mortgage recordedin other words, that the record of the second mortgage was equivalent to actual notice to the first mortgagee. READ, J., who
delivered the opinion of the court, appeared to entertain doubts
whether, under the statutes of Ohio, a mortgage for future advances
was valid at all, inasmuch as the statute "1makes the recording a
part of the execution," (p. 378), and stated, that,e court were
" all agreed that the clause for future advances, f allowed any
legal effect whatever, should be narrowly guarded and restricted.
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Such clause can only be tolerated in any sense upon the ground
that it advises subsequent mortgagees or purchasers that future
advances were contemplated, and enables them by inquiry to
ascertain the extent of the encumbrance."
AVERY, J., dissented, and BIRCHARD, 0. J., and HITCHCOCK, J.,
concurred specially, on the ground that the record was notice
because "the statute declares that all mortgages shall be recorded
in the office of the county recorder, and shall take effect from
the time when the same are recorded. Spader's mortgage (the
second) took effect in 1836, and its effect was to hold and bind
the precise interest which Bonsal (mortgagor) then had in the
premises. So far as Lawler's (the first) mortgage was concerned,
the estate was at that time bound only for the balance then due
him."
In Pennsylvania, in Terifoven v. KYerns, 2 Barr 96 (1845), it
was held by KENNEDY, J., in delivering the opinion of the court,
that the first mortgagor was bound to look at the record before
making his advances, but the case is hardly satisfactory as an
authority, as SERGEANT, J., dissented, and the decision was plainly
right on another ground, that the first judgment-creditor had
furnished a statement of the amount due on his lien, on the faith
of which the second creditor had advanced his money.
In 1860, however, this point was expressly decided, in accordance with the opinion of Judge KENNEDY, and it is now the
settled law of that state: Bank of lHontgomery County's Appeal,
12 Casey 170; s. c., sub nomine Parkerv. Jacoby, 3 Grant 300.
In Michigan, in Ladue v. D. & $I. Railroad Co., 13 Mich.
380 (1865), the whole subject was most elaborately considered,
and the cases reviewed by CHRISTIANCY, J. That was a bill
to foreclose a mortgage given by John Ladue to Andrew Ladue
& Co., to secure and indemnify them against endorsements which
might be made, or liabilities which might be incurred by them as
sureties of said John Ladue. The mortgagees were not bound
to make endorsements or incur any liabilities. John Ladue conveyed the land by warranty-deed duly recorded, and the only
liabilities claimed (though it appeared that others had been incurred but discharged), were for endorsements made subsequent to
the recording of this deed, which had been paid by Ladue & Co.,
the mortgagces. There was no proof of notice to the mortgagees
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of the conveyance other than the recording of the deed. The
court held the record to be sufficient notice.
From the foregoing review of the decisions it will be seen that
they are in direct antagonism, and that there cannot be said to
be any settled American rule on the subject. The leading case
in favor of holding the record to be notice is Spader v. Lawler,
decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in 1848, and in that
case it is to be observed that the argument of READ, J., concedes
the ground on which the point has been ruled differently in the
cases already cited. "1Such clause can only be tolerated in any
sense upon the ground that it advises subsequent mortgagees or
purchasers that future advances were. contemplated, and enables'
them by inquiry to ascertainthe extent of the encumbrance." It
being thus conceded that the second mortgagee is put on his guard
and furnished with the means of ascertaining the real extent of
the encumbraidce, he is to be treated as possessed of all the information that diligent inquiry would have afforded him; the burden
of inquiry is put upon him, and we are unable to stop short of
the conclusion that the first mortgagee is relieved from all obligation of inquiry, and bound only to good faith, including a refusal to make further advances to the prejudice of the second
mortgage after actual knowledge of it.
Besides this, the general scope of the recording laws is undoubtedly prospective, and not retrospective. The mortgagee
having examined the mortgagor's title down to the making of his
mortgage, and having then a clear, legal and valid security, may
rest upon it until such information is brought home to him in fact
as ought properly to impose upon him the burden of a re-examination. As to the supposed hardship of this rule upon the second
mortgagee, we think -that is effectually disposed of by the pithy
argument of TRUMBULL, J., in Collins v. Carlisle,13 Ills. 259, that
defendants "had notice by the record of the mortgage previous
to the time of their purchase, of a lien on the premises to the
extent of $500, and surely they cannot complain when, upon full
disclosure, it turns out that the amount of the lien is less than
that sum."
So far as we may venture a personal opinion, therefore, we
think the rule that the recording of the second mortgage is not
notice to the first mortgagor, is supported by the better rtasons,
and that the weight of authority is still in its favor, though we

